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1. Introduction 
 
Agent-based models and the sociology of organized 
action 
 
Agent-based modeling (ABM) consists in describing 
the behavior of the active entities of a system of 
interest (the agents) and how they interact within 
their shared environment. Thus, the way the model 
functions is the consequence of the interactions 
between the agents and of their behaviors. As long as 
the phenomena observed in the system are well 
reproduced in the outputs of the simulation model, the  
 
 
 
model provides a possible realistic explanation for the 
occurrence of these phenomena (AXELROD, 1997). 
 
This approach is especially fruitful for studying complex 
systems that cannot be tackled by analytical approaches 
without a distorting over-simplification. It is 
increasingly used for the simulation of social systems 
(see, for example, the Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation1). 
 
                                                       
1 http:// jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk  
  
The present paper describes the analyses of simulations 
produced by an agent-based social simulation platform 
called SocLab2.  
SocLab was designed for analyzing social organizations, 
or more generally systems of organized action, where 
people regularly interact for a given purpose in a given 
context.  
SocLab is based on a well established sociological 
theory of organizations, the sociology of organized 
action (SOA), introduced by (Crozier 1964) and 
(Crozier and Friedberg 1977). Roughly speaking, SOA 
analyzes social organizations in order to explain why 
people behave as they do, especially when they do not 
behave as they are supposed to according to rules of the 
organization. 
An organization is defined as a set of actors and a set of 
resources. Each actor has some goals, which are a mix of 
his own objectives and his organizational roles, and he 
needs some resources to reach these goals. On the 
other hand, each actor controls the access to some 
resources, and so determines to what extent those 
needing these resources have the means to achieve 
their goals.  
Actors are assumed to be rational, that is to say their 
behavior is driven by their beliefs about the best way to 
achieve their goals. Therefore each actor manages the 
resources he controls and cooperates with others in 
order to obtain from them access to the resources he 
himself needs. The actors are reciprocally dependent 
on each other and we call social actor game the process 
by which they mutually adjust their behaviors with 
respect to others.  
Most organizations feature the well-known regulation 
phenomenon: according to it, the adjustment process 
regularizes an organization so that its actors are found 
to exhibit essentially steady behaviors. The agent-based 
modeling and simulation of an organization are 
expected to shed light about its possible regulations.  
The SocLab analysis of organizations 
This section describes more precisely the structure of a 
SocLab model of a given organization (see (Sibertin-
Blanc et al. 2013a) for a comprehensive presentation of 
the SocLab framework). 
                   
2 http://soclabproject.wordpress.com/using-soclab  
 
Figure 1. Model of organizations according to the SocLab 
platform 
 
The first step is made by the sociologist: using surveys 
and fieldwork, the sociologist analyses the organization 
and observes the behavior of the actors and how much 
each one cooperates. Then, through an intuitive user 
interface, the SocLab platform allows him to edit his 
model, which describes the structure of the 
organization. This step is highly dependant on expert 
knowledge and is very important in order to obtain a 
model that represents reality well. In order to design a 
model in SocLab, the following elements have to be 
defined (see also Figure 1): 
 
 the list of actors; 
 
 the list of the resources: each resource is controlled 
(or managed) by an actor. This actor behaves in a 
more or less cooperative way and the state of a 
resource measures (on a scale of -10 to 10) how 
much he tends (or does not tend) to cooperate 
with others by favoring (or hindering) access to 
the resource; 
 
 the stake of every actor on every resource: this 
quantity measures the importance of a given 
resource for a given actor. The more a resource is 
needed to achieve an actor's important goal, the 
higher the corresponding stake (on a scale of zero 
to ten; the sum of the stakes for every actor sums 
to ten); 
 
 the effect function of every resource on every actor 
having a not null stake on this resource: this 
function quantifies how well the actor can use the 
resource to reach his goals, depending on the state 
of the resource; 
 
 the solidarities of every actor toward each of the 
others. 
 
A configuration (or state) of the organization is defined 
as the vector of the resource states. Thus, a 
configuration is characterized by the level of 
cooperation of each actor with regard to the others. In 
any configuration of the organization, every actor gets 
 from others some capacity to mobilize the resources 
needed to achieve his objectives. This satisfaction of an 
actor a when the organization is in a configuration s = 
(sr)r Î R is calculated as the sum of the values of the 
effect functions, weighted by the actors stake: 
 
satisfaction(a, s) = år Î R stake(a, r) * effectr(a, sr) (1) 
 
SocLab provides some tools for the analytical 
investigation of (the model of) an organization. For 
instance, it computes many indicators about structural 
or state-dependent properties of the organization. It 
also allows the user to interactively explore the space of 
the organizations configurations and to compare the 
resulting satisfactions for the actors, e.g., the 
configurations which optimize or minimize the 
satisfaction of a given actor or the Nash equilibria 
(Chapron, 2012). 
 
The SocLab platform includes a simulation engine 
which implements the regulation process within an 
organization and thus computes which behavior each 
actor is likely to adopt (El Gemayel et al., 2011). To 
this end, a multi-agents implementation of the model 
of an organization provides the actors with a rationality 
for playing the social actor game. Social actors try, as a 
meta-goal, to get a high level of satisfaction, i.e., to 
have the means needed to achieve their concrete goals. 
However, according to the bounded rationality 
assumption (Simon, 1955) they just look for a 
satisficing level of satisfaction, not an illusory optimal 
one. So, within a trial-error reinforcement learning 
process (Sutton and Barto, 1998), each actor maintains 
a dynamic level of aspiration, and a simulation 
terminates when a stationary state is reached because 
every actor has a satisfaction that is over his level of 
aspiration. In such a state, the actors' behaviors are 
such that each one accepts his level of satisfaction and 
the ones of others: the organization can work in this 
way, a regulated configuration has been found. The 
length of a simulation, i.e. the number of steps 
necessary to reach a stationary state, indicates how 
much it is difficult for the actors to jointly find out how 
to cooperate. Full explanations about this algorithm are 
given in (Sibertin-Blanc et al. 2013b) and (El Gemayel, 
2013). 
 
This simulation algorithm is partly stochastic, so that 
each simulation constitutes an experiment, whose 
outputs provide values for the state of each resource 
and the satisfaction gained by each actor. The designer 
of the model of an organization expects that a specific 
simulation experiment corresponds to the observed 
state of the organization. If this is not the case, the 
model of the organization is to be revised, except if the 
sociologist is able to explain this anomaly by peculiar 
causes. However, the SOA is fully compliant with the 
fact that the simulation includes experiments that are 
quite far from the observed state of the real 
organization: they correspond to potentialities, 
possible ways of operating of the organization, to 
configurations which have not been observed yet but 
which might be observed in the future. A tight 
matching between all simulation experiments and the 
observed state of the organization will be interpreted by 
the sociologist as a structural property of the 
organization: this results from a strongly regulated 
organization in which actors have a limited freedom to 
depart from a normative behavior. Thus, as long as the 
model of the organization under study is not strongly 
regulated, SocLab should provide a large number of 
experiments which correspond to different possible 
futures. The identification of different operating 
scenarios can give a simplified overview of the internal 
possibilities of the organization and it can also help 
decipher the balance of power and the intrinsic 
structure of the organization. 
 
In the present article, such an approach is illustrated on 
a real-world case study related to water management in 
a French region. Section 2 describes the case study and 
the variables provided in the companion dataset. 
Section 3 describes the statistical analysis of the 
simulations, focusing on statistical methods that 
provide a simplified and visual representation of the 
dataset. In particular, self-organizing maps are used to 
extract the main regulated configurations of the 
organization that may be envisioned. The results are 
commented in regards with the underlying sociological 
context. A discussion and a conclusion are finally 
provided in Section 4. 
 
2. The source of the data 
 
Context 
 
This dataset contains the outputs of 100 simulations 
generated by the SocLab model of an organized action 
system concerning the management of a river called 
Touch. Touch is a tributary of the Garonne in which it 
flows downstream of Toulouse, an agglomeration of one 
million inhabitants in the South West of France. Its 
catchment area covers 60 municipalities and its course 
crosses 29 municipalities. Three fourth of these 
municipalities stand upstream and are mainly 
agricultural villages or small towns. Unlike upstream 
areas, the one fourth municipalities located 
downstream form a dense urban area of the Toulouse 
 agglomeration. Downstream municipalities have had to 
deal with several episodes of flooding during past 
decades. They consider that upstream municipalities do 
not cooperate enough and they have tried to protect 
themselves by building dikes that, even if expensive, 
are not sufficient to eliminate the risk of flood. On the 
contrary, upstream municipalities, strongly influenced 
by farmers, consider that they have taken responsibility 
for preventing flooding by letting some land lie 
uncultivated, in order to absorb the excess water in 
case of flooding.  
 
Since 1995, French water policy has required the 
elaboration of a flood risk prevention plan (FRPP) of each 
river, and this obligation was reinforced by the 
European Water Framework Directive (WFD 
2000/60/EC), transposed into French law as the Law on 
Water and Aquatic Ecosystems (LEMA, Law of 30 
December 2006). On the occasion of the establishment 
of the PRPP of the Touch, Baldet (2012) studied the 
difficulties of reaching an agreement that combines the 
views of all the field stakeholders and of administrative 
authorities. He analyses the field observations in the 
light of several sociological theories. The SocLab 
model, whose simulation results are reported in this 
paper, describes the system of organized action devoted 
to the elaboration of the Touch's FRPP and has been 
designed in order to formally confirm (or infirm) the 
empirical findings. We briefly introduce the actors and 
the resources of the system and outline the issues at 
hand. The interested reader will find in the paper by 
(Sibertin-Blanc et al. 2013c) a detailed presentation of 
the case, including the empirical and theoretical 
dimensions, the SocLab model itself and the dataset of 
the simulation results. 
 
Actors 
 
The action system includes 10 actors who are involved 
in the management of the river and depend in some 
way on the FRPP: 
 
 actor 1: Departmental Territory Direction (DDT) 
acts as the State representative and will instruct 
the new FRPP; 
 
 actor 2: National Office for Water and Aquatic 
Ecosystem (ONEMA) is the reference agency for 
the monitoring of water and aquatic environment; 
 
 actor 3: Adour-Garonne Water Agency (AEAG) is 
the operational authority in charge of strategic 
plans at the basin level. Accounting for the 
requirements of the various water uses and of the 
protection of aquatic ecosystems, it defines, 
supervises and funds the water policy; 
 
 actor 4 is a citizen organization of riparian farmers 
in the upstream area. They own floodplain land 
and, as they are riparian, they have the right to 
use the river and must maintain the banks; 
 
 actor 5 is the group of 25 upstream municipalities 
that have 21,000 inhabitants; 
 
 actor 6 is the group of downstream municipalities 
(75,000 inhabitants) that are impacted at each 
occurrence of a natural catastrophe. Due to 
flooding threats, they must prohibit any building 
on a portion of their territory; 
 
 actor 7 is the inter-communal association for water 
civil engineering (SIAH) 3 , in charge of the 
management of the Touch. Especially, it has to 
maintain the river bed and banks. It includes 
representatives of the 29 riparian municipalities 
and its active manager favors cooperation among 
municipalities while paying attention to the Good 
Ecological Status of the river; 
 
 actors 8 and 9 are political authorities, the regional 
and departmental councils, respectively. They can 
bring additional financial support to civil 
engineering measures; 
 
 actor 10 is an engineering consulting firm, 
specialized in water, energy and environment, in 
charge of technical studies. 
 
The actors who are the most engaged in the 
negotiation, are actors 6, 4 and 5 from the population 
point of view, and actors 7, 3 and 9 from the 
institutional point of view. All these actors are strongly 
concerned with both the elaboration and further 
implementation of the FRPP. Actors 1, 2, 8 and 10 are 
less concerned. 
 
Resources 
 
In this model, each actor controls one resource that 
summarizes its means to influence the discussion. 
 
                                                       
3 Literally Syndicat Intercommunal dAménagement Hydraulique of 
the Touch, committed by the State to maintain the river for the sake of 
the riparian people. Riparian people own the river up to the middle of its 
bed. This association is funded by the Water Agency (actor 3). See 
http://www.siah-du-touch.org. 
  Validation (between -10 and 10) is the more or 
less harsh regard of actor 1 on the prevention plan 
proposed by actor 7. This validation is made on the 
basis of technical and ecological criteria; 
 
 Expertise (between -8 and 8) is the outcome of a 
study of which actor 2 is in charge. Actor 2 can 
give a positive or a negative appraisal on the 
construction work, based mostly on ecological 
criteria; 
 
 Funding (between -8 and 8) is a source of 
funding coming from actor 3 which can pay for up 
to 75% of the total cost of a construction work if 
the project is considered as ecological; 
 
 Lobbying (between -10 and 10) is an action 
controlled by actor 4 which owns the floodplain 
lands. As this actor is not much concerned by 
ecological issues, it frequently argues against actors 
2 and 3; 
 
 Control of flow (between -8 and 8) is the 
capability of upstream villages (actor 5) to keep in 
their territory a part of the water that provokes 
flooding episodes downstream; 
 
 Self funding (between -8 and 8) is the capacity of 
downstream villages (actor 6) to fund civil 
engineering works; 
 
 River management (between -8 and 8) is the 
activity of actor 7 in river management: a low level 
means that the association is minimizing its 
involvement in river maintenance and a high level 
means that the association is involved in trying to 
prevent threats coming from the river; 
 
 Additional funding (between -7 and 7) is the 
financial involvement of actor 8 in the project; 
 
 Additional funding 2 (between -6 and 6) is the 
financial involvement of actor 9 in the project: 
actor 9 has its own bureaucratic rules which govern 
whether or not to give a project financial 
assistance. A high level for this resource means 
harder (mainly ecological) constraints to grant the 
project; 
 
 Studies (between -8 and 8) is a study made by 
actor 10: a positive value means that the study 
suggests a hydromorphological solution (i.e., an 
ecological approach that uses the shape of the river 
to try to prevent flooding) and a negative value 
means that the study suggests a hydraulic solution 
(dike construction, which is less ecological). 
 
The analysis of the debates, notably within the SIAH, 
displays three main options for the management of the 
Touch, each supported by some of the actors: 
 
1. (O1) protecting the downstream towns against 
floods, and defending the interests of these 
municipalities (supported by actor 6); 
 
2. (O2) protecting the daily life of upstream villages, 
and especially protecting agricultural activities 
(supported by actors 4 and 5); 
 
3. (O3) ensuring a good ecological state of the 
aquatic environment (supported by actors 2 and 
3). 
 
Upstream and downstream municipalities are 
interdependent, although their respective interests are 
different or even conflicting. So the elaboration of the 
FRPP includes a fourth option which is probably the 
main issue in the discussions: 
 
4. (O4) finding a solution which is a compromise 
acceptable to the population and its 
representatives (sought by actors 7, 3, 1, 8 and 9 by 
order of influence, according to their respective 
status). This issue is essential because, whatever 
the chosen solution for the management of the 
Touch, it will not be effectively implemented if it is 
not agreed by most actors. 
 
3. Statistical analysis 
 
Dataset description  
 
The dataset contains the outputs of 100 simulations 
with, for each one, the number of steps, the state of the 
10 resources and the satisfaction of the actors at the 
end of the simulation. The satisfaction of each actor 
depends on the state of the resources, via a function 
that involves its stakes and the resources' effect 
functions (see Equation (1)). Each actor puts 3 or 4 
stake points on the relation it controls so that its 
satisfaction depends about one third on its own 
behavior. The possible range of values of actors' 
satisfactions are quite varied, from 90 (actor 2) to 195 
(actor 6). Their lower bounds (the worst configuration 
for each of them) are on a scale of 25 (actor 2) to 85 
(actor 6) and their upper bounds (the best 
configuration) on a scale of 60 (actor 8) to 110 (actor 
6). 
 Univariate Statistical Analysis 
 
A quick overview of the values of the variables is 
provided in Figure 2. The number of steps is strongly 
skewed with a small number of simulations having a 
very large number of steps. Most resource states 
(except for Self funding, River management and 
Additional funding) also have a skewed distribution, 
with several outliers having small (and even negative 
for some of them) values. The spread of the state 
variables is very different: some variables have a very 
small dispersion, like Validation (which is frequently 
equal to 10, the maximum possible value) or 
Additional funding 2 which is almost always equal to 
6 (also its maximum possible value). For these 
resources, as well as for Lobbying, Control of flow 
and River management (but to a lesser extent), the 
organization's constraints are such that the possible 
values for these resources seem almost fixed in 
advance. On the contrary, Expertise, or even Self 
funding and Additional funding are resources that 
have a larger dispersion (for Expertise the values go 
from 8 to 8): the actors who control these resources 
are less constrained by the organization and a deeper 
analysis is necessary in order to decide whether they 
hesitate between quite similar choices or whether they 
strategically adapt their behavior to the context. 
 
The satisfactions of most actors are approximately 
symmetric, but with a small variability regarding their 
range (most interquartile ranges are less than 3).  
 
Red is used to emphasize actors for which the median 
satisfaction is smaller than 50 (actors which are thus 
frequently unsatisfied: actors 4, 6 and 10) whereas blue 
is used in the other case. Actors 3, 8 and 9 are the most 
satisfied in almost all simulations (actor 8 is always the 
most satisfied). As actor 6 has a low satisfaction, option 
(O1) will probably not prevail. The same holds for 
actors 4 and 5, and thus for option (O2), but to a lesser 
extent. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Boxplots for the number of steps before the simulations converge (left), the resource states (middle) and the actors 
satisfactions (right). For actors, a blue boxplot indicates that the actor has a median satisfaction that is above 50 and a red 
boxplot indicates that the actor has a median satisfaction that is below 50. 
 
As the satisfaction of actors 2 and 3 is slightly better, 
option (O3) seems to be the most likely. As the 
satisfaction of actor 7 is medium, it seems that a 
compromise that would be acceptable by most actors is 
possibly (O4), and this is compliant with the fact that  
 
none of the options (O1), (O2) or (O3) strongly 
prevails upon the others. 
 
The dispersion of the actors' satisfactions shows that 
the positions of actors 4, 9, 6 and 3 are well settled, 
 
 while the positions of actors 5 and 7 are more 
uncertain. Considering their respective range of values, 
the actors satisfactions are globally more steady (with 
smaller dispersions) than those of the resource states: 
the variation coefficients of actor satisfactions have a 
range of 0.02 to 0.06, whereas those of resource states 
have a range of 0.06 to 0.98 (except for Additional 
Funding 2). This fact might be explained by a complex 
system effect, where actors compensate the lack of 
accessibility to an important resource by accessing 
another one. 
 
Correlation analysis 
 
Figure 3 displays a graphical representation of the 
correlation coefficients between all pairs of variables. 
The number of steps has a slight negative influence on 
all actors, except for upstream actors 4 and 5. This is a 
general property of the simulation algorithm: long 
simulations indicate that actors struggle to find a 
configuration that provides each of them with an 
acceptable level of satisfaction. This difficulty to 
cooperate entails lower levels of satisfaction. 
 
The correlations between the actors satisfactions show 
two groups of strongly related actors: actors 1, 2, 3 and 
7, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, actors 8 
and 9. Actors 1, 2 and 3 are organizations that 
represent the State and carry out public policies. The 
positive correlation between their satisfactions means 
that their main interests are consistent and that these 
three domains of State policy strengthen one another.  
 
Moreover, actor 7, instituted by actor 1 and funded by 
actor 3, is shown to be in accordance with State 
services. Actors 8 and 9 are political institutions and it 
is not surprising that they have similar interests on 
topics such as river management. Moreover, the 
correlation between the two groups is positive: there is 
no conflict between the State and local authorities. 
 
As for actors 4, 5 and 6, they are highly concerned with 
the functioning of the river. They have to be regarded 
in conjunction with actor 7, which is the place where 
they can build a compromise together. Actor 5 seems 
careful; surprisingly, it does not support the farmer 
association nor is it in conflict with downstream 
municipalities.  
 
The case of actor 4 requires specific attention: it is in 
conflict with actors 6 and 7, and also with most of the 
other actors. However we will see that this conflict is 
not powerful enough to prevent a decision to be made 
(this is because the effect functions of the relation it 
controls have a small amplitude).  
 
The satisfaction of actor 7 is positively correlated with 
those of actors 5 and 6, and also actors 2 and 3: these 
actors support options (O1), (O2) or (O3). This fact 
confirms the possibility of a compromise (O4), which 
has already been pointed out in the analysis of actor 
satisfactions. 
 
Some resource states are strongly correlated to actor 
satisfactions: Expertise is strongly correlated with the 
satisfaction of actor 1, which is explained because actor 
1 is strongly concerned with ecological issues. 
Ecological issues are indeed the main criterion for the 
level of this resource. Funding is strongly correlated 
to the satisfaction of actors 8 and 9 because a higher 
financial engagement from actor 3 means a lesser need 
for their financial effort; moreover, actor 3 bases its 
degree of implication on ecological issues and so, his 
concern meets those of actors 8 and 9. 
 
 Control of flow is the most influential resource on all 
actors' satisfactions, all the while its values are little 
dispersed (see Figure 2): it is strongly positively 
correlated with the satisfaction of actor 4 and it is 
strongly negatively correlated with the satisfaction of 
the other actors (except for actor 5): a low level of this 
resource means a stronger control on the river and thus 
a higher decision power for actors 2, 3, 6 and 7.  
 
Finally, Self funding is strongly negatively correlated 
with the satisfaction of actors 5 and 7: a high level for 
this resource means a higher decision power for actor 6 
which reduces the decision power of actors 5 and 7.  
 
These results show that the behavior of the model is 
strongly non-linear: contrary to the very structure of 
the model, the satisfaction of most actors is not strongly 
correlated to the resource that it controls. The actor 
might somehow compensate for an unsatisfactory level 
of its own resource by a better level of the other 
resources. A complete explanation of this phenomenon 
would require further investigation. 
 
  
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the correlation coefficients between pairs of variables: the thinner the ellipse, the larger 
the absolute value of the correlation coefficient (as described in MURDOCH and CHOW, 1996 and implemented in the R 
package ellipse). Red ellipses indicate positive correlations whereas blue ones indicate negative correlations, the intensity of 
the color also matches the absolute value of the correlation coefficient (darker colors are used for larger values). 
There is no remarkable correlation between any pair of 
relations: the actors' behaviors are independent of one 
another. There is no coordination or coalition within a 
subgroup of actors, no actor seems to strongly influence 
the behavior of another one and, in other words, each 
actor is autonomous with regard to others. 
 
Hierarchical clustering 
 
To be able to understand multiple complex correlations 
between the actor satisfactions and behaviors, pairwise 
correlations studies are not enough. Multiple correlations 
can be understood by a number of methods, such as PCA, 
MDS, clustering... In the present section a hierarchical 
clustering is performed and analyzed. Figure 4 is the 
resulting dendrogram, where four clusters of simulations 
are identified. A first observation is that one simulation is 
clearly an outlier, the simulation number 16 (at the right 
hand side of the dendrogram). 
 
Figures 5 and 6 display an overview of each cluster: the 
boxplots of the number of steps, of the resource states 
and of the actor satisfactions for each cluster. They allow 
us to compare the relative positions of the actors and 
resources within every cluster. In addition, Figures 7 and 
8 display the component point of view: each actor's 
satisfactions and each resource's states are displayed by 
cluster, in order to make the comparison between clusters 
easier to read. The first fact worth noting is that all four 
clusters are very similar in the way the satisfactions of the 
different actors are ranked: actors 3, 8 and 9 are always 
the most satisfied and actors 4, 6 and 10 are always the  
 
Figure 3. Hierarchical clustering. Experiments are partitioned into 4 clusters (numbered from 1 (at left) to 4 (at right)) as 
represented by the colored rectangles. An outlier (simulation number 16) can also be identified (at the right hand side of the 
figure). 
 
least satisfied. Also, by comparing the clusters, differences 
can be emphasized. 
 
The most singular cluster is cluster number 2 (containing 
7 simulations, in orange): the simulations of cluster 2 are 
characterized by a higher satisfaction for all actors 
(especially for actor 6), except for actor 4 (compared to 
other clusters). This fact is consistent with the small 
number of steps. Also, we note that the satisfaction of 
actors 5 and 7 is highly varying, which indicates an 
unsure position for these actors. On the resource point of 
view, the cluster is characterized by lower states for the 
resource Lobbying (controlled by actor 4) and also for 
the Control of flow. Another prominent fact of this 
cluster is that actor 7 is ranked over the others (except 
for actors 3, 8 and 9 which are at the top in all cases); 
these facts indicate that these simulations comply with 
option (O4).  
Cluster 2 corresponds to reaching the best compromise in 
the process of elaborating the new public policy for the 
river Touch. Unfortunately it is not the most likely 
outcome, since the cluster includes only 7% of 
simulations, but it is a possible outcome. 
 
Cluster 1 (containing 20 simulations, in green) contains 
simulations that are almost exactly the opposite of cluster 
2: in this cluster, all actors have a lower satisfaction than 
in the other cases, except for actor 4. In these 
simulations, the state of Control of flow is high and the 
state of Funding and Expertise is low.  
 
These simulations correspond to the success of option 
(O2) over the other options: in this option, actors 4 and 
5 succeed in making their interest prevail over the other 
actors' interests.  
Cluster 1 
 
Cluster 2 
 
Figure 5. Boxplots of the number of steps (left), of the resource states (middle) and of the actor satisfactions (right), for 
clusters 1 (top) and 2 (bottom). The boxplot colors have the same meaning than in Figure 2. 
 
Cluster 3 
 
Cluster 4 
 
Figure 6. Boxplots of the number of steps (left), of the resource states (middle) and of the actor satisfactions (right), for 
clusters 3 (top) and 4 (bottom). The boxplot colors have the same meaning than in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 7. Boxplot of the actors' satisfactions by cluster. 
 
Clusters 3 and 4 (respectively, 42 and 31 simulations, in 
purple and pink) are clusters with mostly average values, 
where most actor satisfactions and resource states take an 
intermediate value between those of clusters 1 and 2. 
These clusters gather 75% of the simulations and thus 
correspond to the most likely outcome of the negotiation 
process.  
 
Cluster 3 is characterized by a stable low satisfaction for 
actors 5 and 7 and by a high state for Self funding. 
These simulations are rather in favor of option (O1).  
 
In cluster 4, actors 4 and 5 are more satisfied than in the 
other clusters and the state of Self funding and 
Studies is low. These simulations are rather in favor of 
option (O2). 
 
Finally, simulation 16 (in cluster 4) is very unlike the 
others: in this simulation the number of steps is low (814 
whereas the median number of steps is equal to 1,032 and 
the average number of steps is equal to 1,259), indicating 
a fast convergence and thus the likelihood of a good 
overall satisfaction of the actors.  
 
Indeed, almost all actors are very satisfied in this 
simulation, except for actors 5, 6 and 7 but the main fact 
worth noting is that all resources have reached their 
upper bound values in this simulation. We will elaborate 
on this specific simulation in the next section 
 
 
Figure 8. Boxplots of the resources' states by cluster. 
 
4. Self-organizing map 
 
Finally, the simulations are clustered using a Self-
Organizing Map (SOM, Kohonen 2000) algorithm. SOM 
is an unsupervised learning method that maps the data 
onto a one- or a two-dimensional grid. The grid is made 
of several neurons in which the simulations are clustered. 
The grid comes up with a topology and the clustering is 
performed so that the topological properties of the input 
space are preserved on the grid: hence, two simulations 
classified in neurons close on the grid are more alike than 
two simulations classified in neurons that are distant on 
the grid. Thus, this method provides clustering combined 
with visualization where the whole set of simulations can 
be displayed and the relations between the main features 
of the simulations can be understood. The size of the grid, 
as well as its topology, are chosen by the user. A frequent 
heuristic is to choose a grid having dimensions /10N  
and a square or an hexagonal topology. 
 
In this application a batch version of the SOM algorithm 
is used, as implemented in the R package yasomi4. 
 
 
Figure 9. Hitmap: the size of each colored square is 
proportional to the number of simulations classified in the 
corresponding neuron. 
 
Figure 9 is the hit map of the resulting SOM: the size of 
each cluster corresponds to number of simulations it 
gathers. The cluster located at the top right corner of the 
map contains a single observation, simulation 16, 
described as an outlier in the previous section.  
 
Figures 10 and 11 display the clusters' profiles, regarding 
the actor satisfactions and the resource states, 
respectively. On the other hand, Figures 12 and 13 
display, with a color scale, the average values of the 
variables by cluster, compared to the global range of the 
variables, to make the comparison between clusters 
easier. 
 
Regarding the map, the most typical simulation cases are: 
 
 at the top right hand side of the map, which 
corresponds to simulation 16, most actors are not 
                                                      
4 Still under development but available at https://r-forge.r-
project.org/projects/yasomi/  
satisfied, except for actors 4, 8, 9 and 10. There, 
actor 4 is much more satisfied than in the other 
clusters. Moreover, the simulation shows a lower 
satisfaction of upstream villages (low values for 
Expertise and Funding) and a high satisfaction 
for the riparian farmers (higher value for Lobbying 
and Control of flow). Although all resources are at 
their top level, the outcomes of these simulations 
show some inconsistencies: (O1) is not likely (for 
actor 6, this is the worst case), nor is (O2) (despite 
the fact that actor 4 is very satisfied, actor 5 is not), 
nor is (O3) (this is also the worst case scenario for 
actor 3). This is confirmed by the failure of (O4) 
(for actor 7, this is the worst case scenario). So this 
cluster corresponds to a case having a very low social 
plausibility because every actor is losing; 
 
 the left hand side of the map is characterized by an 
opposite description: most actors are quite satisfied 
and the level of self funding, coming from actor 6, is 
high. These simulations also show a high level of 
funding coming from actor 3. Most simulations of 
cluster 2 of the hierarchical clustering are classified 
on the left hand side of the map, and especially on 
the top left corner, which is thus representative of 
option (O4); 
 
 the center of the map (from the bottom left corner 
to the upper right corner) contains simulations that 
were classified in the two other clusters of the 
hierarchical clustering of the previous section. In 
particular, simulations of cluster 4 are classified in 
the bottom left corner and those of cluster 3 in the 
upper right hand side of the map (except for the 
neuron containing only one simulation). These 
simulations correspond to intermediate outcomes 
between the two main options (O2) and (O4). 
These outcomes are closer to options (O1) and 
(O3). 
 
The self-organizing map algorithm thus leads to 
conclusions similar to the ones found with the 
hierarchical clustering algorithm. This approach also 
provides the user with a representation of the set of 
simulations as a map and thus gives an intuitive overview 
on their respective similarities, proximities or differences. 
It details the possibilities of each resource and each actor. 
However this level of detail can make it more difficult to 
identify the social patterns that emerge from the 
simulations. 
 
 
Figure 4. Actor satisfaction distributions in each cluster of the map. Blue boxplots are those for which the median of the 
corresponding actor's satisfaction is above 50 and red boxplots are those for which the median of the corresponding actor's 
satisfaction is below 50. 
 
 
Figure 5. Resource state distributions in each cluster of the map. 
 
 
Figure 6. Average actor satisfactions by cluster: dark green corresponds to the highest values and dark pink to the lowest 
ones. 
 
Figure 7. Average resource states by cluster: dark green corresponds to the highest values and dark pink to the lowest ones. 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In the field of social simulation, most considered cases are 
a rough simplification of a phenomenon which is modeled 
as a stylized fact. The purpose of such simulation 
models is to propose a mechanism, as simple as possible, 
that is able to generate the phenomenon as an emergence 
from the interactions between the systems components. 
In this case, the study of the simulation outputs is easy 
and yields only one piece of information: outputs are 
expected to be steadily focused since their dispersion 
means that the proposed mechanism is not a good 
explanation of the cause of the phenomenon. 
 
On the other hand, the data analysis of simulation 
outputs is a source of valuable knowledge when, as in our 
case, the simulation refers to a concrete system. In this 
case, the purpose of simulation is not just to get a good 
fit between the expected results and the model outputs; 
the distribution of simulation outputs is meaningful and it 
may be compared with field data on the system under 
study5.  
 
On the other hand, the actual configuration which is 
observed is interpreted as just one of the possible 
functioning regimens of the system. This functioning 
regimen has stabilized the actors behavior more or less 
steadily, as the result of past events, contingent 
opportunities or constraints, random choices made at 
bifurcation points, or whatever circumstances. A social 
                                                    
5 Here, we assume the scientific legitimacy of a quantitative approach of 
social affairs and, in the case of this paper, the feasibility of faithful SocLab 
models. We do not elaborate on this, see e.g. Roggero and Sibertin-Blanc, 
2008, for further discussion. 
system exhibits only one of its potentialities and most 
systems could operate in another way under other 
circumstances, to the extent of their adaptability. The 
benefice of the statistical analysis of simulation outputs is 
to reveal these other possible functioning regimens. 
 
The analysis of the set of simulations leads to the 
conclusion that two main opposite options are likely to 
happen: either upstream villages overpower the other 
actors and the daily-life of upstream villages is the main 
factor influencing the final decision (option (O2)) or a 
compromise acceptable for all actors is found (option 
(O4)).  
 
In between these two main configurations, the 
simulations tend to favor more or less one or the other of 
the two options. This typology is well represented on the 
map produced by the SOM algorithm. 
 
For the sociologist, the question about the power 
relationships within the management of the river Touch 
has led to the statement of four hypotheses (see (Sibertin-
Blanc et al. 2013c) for the sociological theories that 
ground theses hypotheses): 
 
Hypothesis 1: In order be the obligatory passage point 
of the Actor-Network, does SIAH have enough power to 
somehow constrain other actors? 
 
Hypothesis 2: Purposing to play an important role and to 
introduce a change in the management of flood risk, does 
SIAH have the means to do so? 
 
Hypothesis 3: Regarding the enrolment of other actors 
into the service of a hydromorphological management of 
the river, does SIAH have powerful allies? 
Hypothesis 4: Is the agreement on the Territorial Public 
Interest confirmed by the absence of major conflict in 
the system of action? 
 
The SocLab model presented in this paper was developed 
to serve as a benchmark for testing these hypotheses, and 
the provided answers integrate arguments coming from 
both the statistical analysis of simulation output and 
analytical properties of the actual model. All in all, the 
SocLab analysis of the case confirms hypotheses 1, 2 and 
3, but not hypothesis 4 which is a necessary condition for 
option O4. 
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Appendix: material description 
The dataset is provided as a csv file separated by tabulations 
named runs-soclab.csv; it was generated from the SocLab 
simulation plateform 
 http://soclabproject.wordpress.com. 
The statistical analysis was performed using the free 
statistical software environment R and the packages ellipse 
and yasomi were used for that purpose. Most results and 
other additional analyses can be reproduced using the 
scripts available on the web page 
 http://www.nathalievilla.org/spip.php?article86 
(this page is unfortunately only in French at the moment).  
In particular, the analyses described in this paper can be 
conducted using the functions CORR(), CAH() and 
SOM(). 
 
